Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case where only one party has the option to delegate, we analyze the possibility that strategic delegation arises as an equilibrium outcome under completely unobservable incentive contracts within the class of two-person extensive form games. We show that delegation may arise solely due to strategic reasons in quite general economic environments even under unobservable contracts. Furthermore, under some reasonable restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and actions of the outside party, strategic delegation is shown to be the only equilibrium outcome. JEL Classification: C72, D80.
Introduction
Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Managers make strategic decisions that a¤ect pro…ts; sales persons have power over setting prices; and lawyers and sports agents represent their clients in bargaining processes. One of the central messages of game theory is that this could be, at least partly, due to the strategic advantage delegation may provide to the delegating party. The idea that signing binding and publicly observable contracts with a third party may serve as a bene…cial commitment device goes back at least to Schelling (1960) , and has been put into use in many areas of economics. 1 However, the observability of contracts appears to be a precondition for them to play a commitment role, and for this reason, almost all applications of strategic delegation theory are couched in terms of observable contracts. The formalization of this intuition is given by Katz (1991) who showed that if contracts are unobservable, then the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game with and without delegation coincide. In particular, delegation through unobservable contracts does not change the predicted outcome of games with a unique Nash equilibrium. These observations, in turn, call the empirical relevance of the applied delegation studies into serious question since, in most real-world transactions, the signed contracts are unobservable to the outside parties.
However, there are important strategic environments that fall outside the con…nes of Katz's analysis. First, Katz's model does not include the scenarios in which the outcome of the decision of delegating or not delegating is observable to the outside party. By contrast, in some models it is natural that the outside party observes the outcome of this decision simply because (s)he knows the identity of his/her opponent (even though (s)he does not know the nature of the associated contract). What is more, this may well endow the delegating party with further powers (of the forward induction type), and yield quite di¤erent insights regarding the plausibility of strategic delegation. Second, Katz's result focuses only on the alterations of the Nash equilibrium outcomes that unobserved delegation may entail. This is also quite crucial because in games where actions are taken in a sequential manner, the set of sequentially rational outcomes is generically smaller than the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, and hence Katz's result does not tell us if these can be altered through unobserved contracts.
In fact, it is not di¢cult to provide examples of extensive form games in which delegation may obtain in some equilibrium (see Katz (1991) , Fersthman and Kalai (1997) ). What is not known is if there is any reason to believe that unobservable delegation has a "bite" in a large class of extensive form games. Put di¤erently, an open problem in the literature is the determination of the conditions (on the primitives of such games) which guarantee that strategic delegation would arise in some equilibrium when contracts between the principals and delegates are not observable. The harder but more interesting problem is, in turn, to identify those games in which strategic delegation arises in all reasonable equilibria. Our objective is to extend Katz's analysis in a way that allows for sequential games and observable delegation decisions to tackle both of these problems.
We call any …nite two-person extensive form game (with perfect information) a principals-only game when each player (principal) plays the game himself. Let us refer to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a principals-only game the pre-delegation outcome of that game. Given any principals-only game, we specify a (one-sided) delegation game as follows: in the …rst stage, one of the principals decides whether to play the game himself or to o¤er, at a cost, an incentive contract to an agent, which speci…es the payo¤ to the agent as a function of the outcome of the game. 2 The agent, in turn, either accepts or rejects the o¤er. If the agent rejects the o¤er, the game is played between the principal and the outside party, and the delegate receives her outside option. If she accepts, then the game is played between the delegate and the outside party, and the delegate receives the payo¤ as speci…ed by the contract. 3 The crucial point that distinguishes this scenario from the ones commonly considered in the literature is that, here, the outside party does not observe the contract o¤ered, and knows only whether he is facing the principal or the delegate.
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Our main objective is to understand the nature of the sequential equilibria of this delegation game in which only one principal has the option to delegate. The …rst observation is that, provided that the cost of hiring an agent is relatively low, delegation may obtain in equilibrium, and this for essentially any principals-only game. More importantly, the outcome induced by delegation in (again essentially any) principals-only game can be quite di¤erent from the pre-delegation outcome of this game. This observation shows that, even under fully unobservable contracts, the act of delegation may possess commitment powers that would alter the outcome which would have obtained in the absence of delegation.
However, this …nding bears an "it is possible that ..." sort of a statement, and hence provides only limited support for the presence of strategic delegation under unobservability. Yet, if we strengthen our equilibrium concept in a reasonable manner, we can understand the strategic consequences of unobserved delegation substantially better. For instance, it is possible to use a forward induction type argument to re…ne the equilibrium to show that delegation is essentially inevitable if the pre-delegation payo¤ of the delegating party is not already the best that he can obtain within a potentially large set of Nash equilibrium payo¤s of the principals-only game. 5 The idea is simply that forward induction reinstates the commitment power of delegation since, under the forward induction hypothesis, the outside party interprets a delegation decision also as a signal 2 In this paper, we study the scenarios in which only one party has the option to delegate. Understanding this simpler scenario is a prerequisite for a proper analysis of the more complicated (but obviously more realistic) case of two-sided delegation. While we will later comment brie ‡y on how our results modify in this case, we should refer the reader to Koçkesen (1999b) for an extensive analysis of the issue. 3 To concentrate on the strategic elements of delegation we assume that (1) the agent's sole function is to make decisions which does not require any e¤ort, and (2) the principal and the agent are symmetrically informed. 4 We continue to assume, however, that no renegotiation of the contract between the principal and the delegate may take place after the game commences. 5 Clearly, it is mainly at this point that positing the realistic assumption of the observability of the identity of the delegate (and hence that of the outcome of "to delegate or not to delegate" decision of the principal) pays its dividends. This contrasts with Katz (1991) in whose model the principal does not have the option of not delegating.
about the contract that is signed. (Why would the principal pay an agent to play the game in place of him, unless he did not instruct the agent to play in a manner that improves his situation over the pre-delegation outcome even after paying the cost of hiring an agent?) Unfortunately, forward induction type arguments that yield the above conclusion run into formal di¢culties in delegation games, as we shall explain in the sequel. Consequently, we prove here the same result by using instead another intuitive equilibrium re…nement, the well-supported equilibrium, which is based on imposing certain reasonable restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs and behavior of the players. 6 Our main result is that if there exists a Nash equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game in which (i ) the delegating principal receives a payo¤ strictly greater than his pre-delegation payo¤, (ii) the outside party behaves sequentially rationally, then in any well-supported equilibrium, the principal will certainly choose to delegate rather than playing the game himself, provided that the cost of hiring an agent is not too high. Moreover, this will alter the pre-delegation outcome in a way that is (strictly) bene…cial for the delegating party.
The main message of the present paper may then be succinctly put as follows: To the extent that renegotiation is costly and/or limited, in a general class of economic settings, strategic aspects of delegation may play an important role in contract design, even if the contracts are completely unobservable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes a simple delegation game to provide motivation for our inquiry and develop the intuition behind our main results. In Section 3, we introduce the basic nomenclature and formally introduce the equilibrium re…nement that we propose here. Section 4 formally describes the economic environment within which we analyze the main question of the paper. In turn, we present our main results in Section 5, and discuss some potential extensions along with some open questions in Section 6. The proofs are contained in Section 7.
Motivation: A Simple Bargaining Example
In order to illustrate the basic intuition behind our results we shall …rst analyze a simple ultimatum bargaining game in which player 1 gives either a low o¤er to player 2 (denoted l) or a high o¤er (denoted h); and player 2 either accepts (denoted y) or rejects (denoted n) the o¤er. If player 1 o¤ers l and player 2 accepts, payo¤s are $5 and $1 for player 1 and player 2, respectively: If player 1 o¤ers h and player 2 accepts, then player 1 receives $1 and player 2 receives $5. If an o¤er is rejected, both players receive a payo¤ of zero. We refer to this game as the principals-only game, and note that it has two Nash equilibrium outcomes (l; y) and (h; y): However, only one of these outcomes is not based on incredible threats by player 2 (i.e., it is the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium): player 1 o¤ers l and player 2 accepts. Now, assume that one of the players (principals) has the option of hiring a third player (whom we call the agent (or the delegate) and denote by A) to play the game for him. More precisely, a player can either play the game himself, that is, not hire a delegate (this action is denoted :D);
6 Similar re…nements are proposed by McLennan (1985) and Hillas (1994) , and discussed extensively in Kreps (1989). or he can o¤er a contract to the agent, at a cost c > 0, which speci…es her payo¤s as a function of the outcome of the principals-only game. In turn, the delegate can either accept or reject the contract. In case of rejection, player 1 and 2 play the game themselves, receive the same payo¤s as in the principals-only game, except that player 2 pays the contracting cost c; and the delegate receives her outside option ± > 0: If, on the other hand, she accepts the contract, then the delegate plays the game in place of the delegating player, and at any given outcome, she receives whatever the contract speci…es for her, the delegating player receives the principals-only game payo¤ minus the cost of hiring, and the other player receives the same payo¤ as in the principals-only game.
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While our description of it is not yet complete, we shall loosely refer to the resulting game as a delegation game in what follows.
Let us begin by observing that if it is player 1 who has the option of hiring an agent, then irrespective of which contracts are feasible and whether they are observable or not, the unique equilibrium of the delegation game would be characterized by player 1 not hiring and hence sustaining his subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤. After all, $5 is the largest possible payo¤ player 1 can hope for in this game, and he expects to receive this payo¤ if he plays the game himself.
8 Consequently, the query is interesting only when it is rather player 2 who has the option of delegating. Moreover, it is easy to see that if the cost of hiring a delegate is too high, i.e., ± + c > 4; then in any sequential equilibrium of the delegation game (independent of contracts being observable or not) player 2 chooses to play the game himself. Therefore, we will analyze the case where ± + c < 4: Let us assume that there are only two contracts available to player 2, T (for tough) and W (for weak); which are speci…ed as follows:
±; if outcome is in f(l; n); (h; y)g 0; otherwise and W = ( ±; if outcome is in f(l; y); (h; y)g 0; otherwise :
For simplicity, we will assume that the delegate accepts any contract that yields her at least her outside option as expected payo¤. (This assumption can be relaxed, provided that one enlarges the contract space suitably.) Therefore, the delegate accepts any contract o¤er in the menu fT; W g since, irrespective of player 1's o¤er, there is always an action which would earn her ±: If the contract signed between player 2 and his delegate were observable to player 1, then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the delegation game would have player 2 o¤ering the contract T; player 1 o¤ering h and the delegate accepting the o¤er. This is of course nothing but a simple demonstration of the bene…cial commitment e¤ects of observable delegation. Things get a bit more complicated, however, if we (realistically) assume that only the decision to hire a delegate or not is observable by player 1, not the contract o¤ered. The description of the game becomes complete under this informational assumption; we refer to this game as the delegation game and depict its basic structure in Figure 1 .
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P There are two types of sequential equilibria of this game. The …rst type is characterized by player 2 not delegating, and the second is characterized by player 2 choosing an action other than :D: In all equilibria of the …rst type, following player 2's action, player 1 o¤ers l and player 2 accepts. At the out-of-equilibrium information set following an accepted contract (denoted I a in Figure 1 ), player 1 believes that contract W has been o¤ered with at least probability 1=5 and he plays l with at least probability 1 ¡ (± + c) =4. In the second type of equilibrium, player 2 places at least probability 4=5 on contract T and, at the information set I a , player 1 plays h.
While all of these equilibria are in fact trembling-hand perfect (Katz (1991) , Fersthman and Kalai (1997)), it is still possible to take issue with the plausibility of a …rst type of equilibrium. To simplify the discussion, let us …rst allow only for pure strategies. (The case of mixed strategies are taken up in Subsection 3.2; see Example 2.) The point is that, in this case, we can apply a natural forward induction argument to "kill" any of the …rst type of equilibria. In particular, no such equilibrium survives the forward induction test proposed by van Damme (1989) . In any pure strategy equilibrium that passes this test, player 2 o¤ers the contract T and player 1 plays h: forward induction ensures delegation even if the contracts are unobservable.
Another observation which points out to what is unreasonable about the …rst type of equilibrium is that the contract W; which aligns the incentives of player 2 and the agent, is not o¤ered in any pure strategy equilibria of the game since player 2 would be better o¤ by playing the game himself rather than hiring an agent through the contract W . Yet, the only way one can support an equilibrium in which player 2 plays :D is by assuming that player 1 believes at I a that the agent he is facing has been o¤ered nothing but the contract W ! In the …nal analysis, whether such beliefs are reasonable or not are formally captured in the equilibrium concept one adopts to "solve" the game. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs supporting an equilibrium of the …rst type (in which player 2 plays :D) are justi…ed in a sequential equilibrium simply because player 1 thinks that player 2 has made a mistake, without trying to make further inferences regarding player 2's possible play which caused the information set I a to be reached. Suppose, in contrast, that player 1 rather reasons, upon facing a delegate unexpectedly, that it is actually he who made a mistake in assuming that a …rst type of equilibrium is accepted as the current norm. (Kreps (1989) calls re…nements based on this line of reasoning "mistaken theory" re…nements; see Section 3.) He may then well conclude that player 2 is playing according to some other equilibrium in which a delegate is hired. But, in no such equilibrium player 2 o¤ers the contract W; and therefore, so player 1 reasons, W cannot be the contract that is signed. Given that his beliefs put probability zero on contract W; player 1's optimal action is h and hence player 2 strictly prefers to delegate in any equilibrium which survives a "mistaken theory" re…nement.
It is not clear which interpretation ("mistakes" or "mistaken theories") is more plausible in general. The answer is likely to depend on the situation being analyzed. In delegation games, however, there is reason to believe that the second interpretation is more convincing. These games depict situations in which individuals decide whether to hire someone to act on their behalf or not in a strategic interaction. It would not be reasonable to think that such a decision, which in reality requires time and e¤ort, takes place without careful deliberation. Hiring someone is a costly action and it is unlikely to take place as a result of sheer irrationality or a simple mistake. Arguably, therefore, in all "reasonable" equilibria of the above delegation game, player 2 hires a delegate and o¤ers a contract so that the equilibrium outcome is di¤erent from the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game. Hence, we contend that delegation is likely to ensue even by means of unobservable contracts; this is the main thesis we shall defend formally in this paper.
In the rest of the analysis, we shall consider arbitrary extensive form principals-only games with perfect information, and derive necessary and su¢cient conditions for the existence of commitment value of delegation under unobservable contracts. More precisely, we will show that if there exists a Nash equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game in which (i) the delegating principal receives a payo¤ strictly greater than her subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤, and (ii) the outside party behaves sequentially rationally, then in any well-supported equilibrium, the principal will certainly choose to delegate rather than playing the game himself, provided that the cost of hiring an agent is low enough.
Preliminaries

Basic Nomenclature
Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) , we de…ne a …nite-horizon extensive form game as a collection¨´[ N; H; P;
Here N denotes a …nite set of players; and H stands for a …nite comprehensive set of …nite sequences interpreted as the set of all histories. 10 An history h is said to be terminal if (h; a) = 2 H for any a 6 = ;; we denote by Z the set of all terminal histories. The function ¼ i : Z ! R is the payo¤ function of player i; and the function P : HnZ ! N is the player function. If P (h) = i, we understand that i moves immediately after history h and chooses an action from the set A(h)´fa 6 = ; : (h; a) 2 Hg: For each i; I i is a partition of H(i)´fh 2 H : P (h) = ig such that A(h) = A(h 0 ) whenever h; h 0 2 I 2 I i . Consequently, without ambiguity, we may write A(I) (P (I); resp.) instead of A(h) (P (h), resp.) for any h 2 I: Any member of I i is called an information set for player i: If all information sets in¨are singletons, we say that this game is with perfect information, and omit information partitions in its de…nition: The subgames of¨are de…ned in the usual way.
A behavioral strategy for player i is de…ned as a set of independent probability measures¯if¯i The set of all behavioral strategies of player i is denoted S i (¨); whereas S(¨)´£ i2N S i (¨): We denote the set of all Nash and subgame perfect equilibria of¨in behavioral strategies by NE(¨) and SPE(¨); respectively.
By a system of beliefs, we mean a set ¹´f¹[I] : I 2 I i for some ig; where ¹[I] is a probability measure on I: We denote the set of all systems of beliefs by B(¨): A 2-tuple (¯; ¹) 2 S(¨) £ B(¨) is called an assessment. An assessment is said to be a sequential equilibrium if it satis…es the properties of consistency and sequential rationality (see Section 7.A for formal de…nitions). We denote the set of all such assessments as SE(¨): The set of all equilibria in SE(¨) that reach to the information set I with positive probability is denoted SE(¨; I):
Well-Supported Bayesian Equilibria
We next introduce a re…nement of sequential equilibria that will play a central role in this paper. Like many others, this re…nement too is based on imposing certain restrictions on the outof-equilibrium beliefs and strategies of the players. Informally put, it leads us to those "wellsupported" sequential equilibria that envisage that at each out-of-equilibrium information set, the beliefs and behavior of the players are consistent with at least one sequential equilibrium that admits this information set on its equilibrium path, provided that such an equilibrium exists. 1 0 By comprehensiveness of H, we mean that ; 2 H; and, for any integer k > 1; (a 1 ; :::; a k ) 2 H whenever (a 1 ; :::; a k+1 ) 2 H: The length of a history h = (a 1 ; :::; a k ) is de…ned to be k and denoted by jhj: As a convention, we take j;j = 0 and let (h; ;) = h for any h 2 H:
Here we shall give the formal de…nition of our re…nement as it applies only to the class of all extensive form games which do not possess an imperfect information subgame which is distinct from the original game. We denote this class of games by G. Our formal treatment is distilled to its simplest form in the context of such games, thereby making the intuition behind the re…nement proposed here transparent. Moreover, the set of games which is the focus of this paper is a subset of G; so this simpli…ed treatment does not cause a loss of generality for our purposes.
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For any¨2 G and any¯2 S(¨); we de…ne I i (¯) as the set of all information sets of player i that are reached by¯with positive probability, and for any information set I; we let I i (I) be the set of all information sets of i that follow I: 12 On the other hand, J (¯) stands for the set of all nonsingleton information sets that could be reached with the shortest sequence of actions after a deviation from¯P (;) [;]; while they are surely not reached when¯P (;) [;] is played.
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De…nition 1. Let¨2 G: A sequential equilibrium (¯; ¹) 2 SE(¨) is said to be well-supported if, and only if, for each I 2 J (¯); either SE(¨; I) = ? or there exists a (¯0; ¹ 0 ) 2 SE(¨; I) such that
for all J 2 I P (I) (I): We denote the set of all well-supported sequential equilibria of¨by SE w-s (¨):
To clarify things, let us take a two-player game¨2 G. Suppose that player 1 moves …rst in this game and suppose that I is a …rst nonsingleton information set of player 2 which is on the out-of-equilibrium path (i.e., I 2 J (¯)). Player 1's move may indeed be a part of a sequential equilibrium (¯; ¹); provided that it is suitably supported by beliefs and the continuation strategy of player 2 at the out-of-equilibrium information set I: In a sequential equilibrium, if I is ever reached, player 2 could interpret this as a simple "mistake." This, however, goes counter to the idea that player 1's deviation could be evaluated by player 2 as containing information about player 1's past (unobserved) actions.
How will player 2 reason when he …nds himself at I which was not supposed to be reached in the equilibrium that is being played? She may plausibly think that player 1 is after coordinating on a di¤erent equilibrium, provided that an equilibrium that reaches I exists (i.e., SE(¨; I) 6 = ;). Of course, if SE(¨; I) = ;; then there is no such plausible explanation of 1's deviation, and hence no restriction is imposed on 2's beliefs and behavior at I: On the other hand, if there exists exactly one such equilibrium, then (¯; ¹) is well-supported only if the beliefs and the strategy of player 2 following this information set accord with what is speci…ed by (¯; ¹): This is precisely the requirement embodied in (1). Alternatively, if there exist more than one such equilibrium, then 1 1 It is not di¢cult to generalize the de…nition of well-supported equilibrium to the class of all …nite extensive form games by means of an inductive argument that admits the de…nition we present here as the …rst step of the induction process. (See Koçkesen (1999a), pp. 91-94.) 1 2 Formally speaking, Ii(I)´fJ 2 Ii : h 00 2 J i¤ h 00 = (h; h 0 ) for some h 2 Ig: Notice that I 2 Ii(I). ; that is, part (c) of the de…nition must hold. Since this is not the case, we conclude that none of the …rst type of equilibria is well-supported. The unique well-supported equilibrium outcome of¨is then (T; L) with the payo¤ pro…le (3; 1): Notably, this is also the unique outcome that passes the forward induction test of van Damme (1989) . It is easy to show that any equilibrium in this game in which player 2 chooses :D with positive probability (…rst type of equilibria) is not well-supported. In any such equilibrium, we have¯2
whereas in all equilibria that reach information set I a (the second type of equilibria) player 1 o¤ers l with zero probability: On the other hand, all the equilibria of the second type, i.e., delegation equilibria, are trivially well-supported. It can be checked that the latter equilibria do not survive the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and hence do not form a strategically stable set. Yet, if one slightly perturbs the game so that there is a positive probability, however small, that the o¤ered contracts are observed, one can show that delegation equilibrium survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. k
We next comment brie ‡y on how the well-supportedness criterion relates to some other major equilibrium re…nements proposed in the literature.
Remarks. (1) (Well-Supportedness, Forward Induction, and the "Mistaken Theory" Re…nements) As noted earlier, Kreps (1989) refers to solution concepts that are based on the idea that deviations should, when possible, be viewed as players coordinating on other equilibria as "mistaken theory" re…nements. A version of this approach was …rst developed by McLennan (1985) who argued that "deviations from the equilibrium path are more probable if they can be explained in terms of some confusion over which sequential equilibrium is "in e¤ect"." (McLennan (1985) , p. 891). This is also the leading motivation behind the forward-induction re…nements of van Damme (1989) and Al-Najjar (1995) , as well as the re…nements proposed by Hillas (1994) and our well-supportedness concept.
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The forward induction re…nement proposed by van Damme (1989) may be found too weak due to its reliance on the viability requirement. (This condition postulates that a deviation is viewed as an unambiguous signal only if there is a unique continuation equilibrium that makes the deviation pro…table for the deviating party.) For this reason, Al-Najjar (1995) has proposed a stronger re…nement that does away with this requirement. Unfortunately, as shown by examples in that paper, this re…nement is in a sense "too strong" for it may well eliminate certain reasonable equilibria. Intuitively speaking, the well-supported equilibrium concept falls in between these two re…nements, at least in the present setup. In particular, van Damme's forward induction criterion is not su¢cient for our second main result (even if we restrict the analysis to pure strategies). On the other hand, Al-Najjar's re…nement delivers that result easily, albeit at the cost of potentially eliminating some equilibria (in which delegation does not take place) in an ad hoc manner.
18 By contrast, while well-supported equilibrium is weaker than Al-Najjar's re…nement, 19 it is strong enough to eliminate all "no-delegation equilibria." Perhaps the best formalization of the "mistaken theory" approach is provided by Hillas (1994) . The well-supported equilibrium is quite close to the re…nements considered by Hillas both in motivation and in formalization. For the record, we report that Hillas's …rst two re…nements (where restrictions are imposed either only on beliefs or only on choice behavior at every information set) are not strong enough for our purposes. His third re…nement puts restrictions on both beliefs and behavior, and is strong enough for our results to go through. The well-supported equilibrium concept is, however, not only weaker than this re…nement, but also much simpler to apply within the delegation games that we study here.
(2) (Well-Supportedness vs. Strategic Stability) The main example analyzed by van Damme (1989, pp. 485-87) shows that strategically stable equilibria (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) ) need not satisfy his forward induction criterion. Since the requirement of well-supportedness chooses precisely the equilibrium chosen by van Damme's forward induction concept in his example, we may also conclude that strategic stability does not imply well-supportedness. Conversely, a wellsupported equilibrium may not survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and hence need not be strategically stable. (See Example 2.) This discrepancy between strategic stability and well-supportedness is not surprising. Like most other similar "mistaken theory" re…nements, well-supportedness is logically independent of the notion of the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, whereas strategic stability admits this notion as a prerequisite. k
We think of well-supportedness as a reasonable (and a somewhat weak) re…nement of the sequential equilibria. Rather than arguing for the superiority of our re…nement over others, however, we subscribe here to the view that "the validity of a particular re…nement for the analysis of a particular economic issue may depend on the setting of that issue in ways that go beyond the formal game-theoretic model that is adopted" (Kreps (1989), p. 7 .) The main objective of this paper is to use the concept of "well-supportedness" in an economic setting in which it is particularly sensible and only mildly demanding. Moreover, in this context, we shall see that it allows one to obtain considerable insight with regard to the underlying economic problem. We turn next to describing this problem in detail.
One-Sided Delegation Environments
In this section we shall introduce a general environment in which we shall study the problem of delegation by unobservable incentive contracts. As one might expect, the framework we outline below admits the simple bargaining-delegation model studied in Section 2 as a special case.
We begin by …xing an arbitrary …nite perfect information principals-only game
We assume that this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, which we consider as the pre-delegation outcome of the environment prior to delegation. We denote the (pre-delegation) expected payo¤ of player i in equilibrium by
The set of all Nash equilibrium payo¤s of i is in turn denoted by
In what follows, we assume that ¦ NE i (¡) is a …nite set for each i = 1; 2: 20 Let NE ¤ i (¡) denote the set of Nash equilibria of ¡ in which the behavioral strategy of player i is sequentially rational after every history. 21 We denote the set of all expected payo¤s for j that correspond to the strategy pro…les in
Suppose that player 2 is contemplating about hiring an agent to play the game ¡ in place of him. The outside option of this agent, henceforth called player A; is a constant ± > 0: That is, player A receives ± dollars with certainty if she rejects the contract o¤ered by player 2. Moreover, we assume that player 2 incurs a contracting cost of c > 0 dollars in case he decides to delegate.
In the literature on strategic contract design, a contract is sometimes de…ned as a mapping that speci…es a level of payment for each strategy of the agent in S 2 (¡): Such a contract provides an extensive amount of control to the principal, and usually simpli…es the analysis considerably. However, especially when randomization is allowed, this de…nition would lead one to view a contract as an unrealistically complicated object. Moreover, it is not at all clear how a principal could in general "observe" the randomized strategy choice of an agent, which, to be able to submit the agent's compensation, he must. At the very least, this would necessitate to extend the model to account for private monitoring of the agent.
In our model a contract is a function that maps the …nite set of terminal nodes Z of the game ¡ to the set of payments: In fact, it will be su¢cient here to focus on those simple contracts that pay the agent either her outside option or nothing at all. Thus, the contract space in our model will be designated as f0; ±g Z : Evidently, any member of f0; ±g Z is an incentive contract that can be conditioned only on the pure outcomes of the game rather than the delegate's strategy.
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While working with such contracts introduces a number di¢culties regarding the formal analysis, it brings us a step closer to realism and avoids worrying about issues related to the "monitoring" of the agents since the pure outcomes of the game ¡ are observable.
The primitives of our model is thus the game ¡; the outside option ± > 0 and the contracting cost c > 0: We thus refer to the 3-tuple [¡; ±; c] as a one-sided delegation environment. Such an environment naturally induces a delegation game
which is a 3-person extensive form game that will on occasion be simply denoted as ¤: The game begins with player 2 deciding between taking the action of not delegating (denoted :D) and an action of attempting to delegate by o¤ering a contract f 2 f0; ±g Z ; which the agent A may accept 2 0 Finiteness of ¦ N E i (¡) is an assumption that helps us avoid some technical redundancies and is generically true for …nite extensive form games (Kreps and Wilson (1982) ).
2 1 Formally,¯¤ 2 NE ¤ i (¡) i¤¯¤ 2 NE(¡) and, for each h 2 H(i); we have¯¤ i 2 arg max¯i 2S i (¡) ¦i(¯i;¯¤ ¡i j h) where ¦i(¢ j h) is the expected payo¤ of player i conditional on history h being reached.
2 2 The distinction is reminiscent of the distinction made by Fershtman and Kalai (1997) between incentive and instructive delegation. (In the former case, the delegate is given an incentive scheme correlating her payments with performance, and in the latter case, she is directly given a strategy that she must follow).
(denoted a) or reject (denoted r). 23 If player 2 chooses not to delegate, or he chooses to o¤er a contract but this contract is rejected by A; then ¡ is played between players 1 and 2. But if player 2 o¤ers a contract f that agent A accepts, then, A (instead of player 2) plays the game ¡ against player 1. Therefore, there are three types of histories in H ¤ : Histories that pertain to the no delegation decision (e.g. (:D; h)) can be identi…ed with those of the principals-only game (that is, with h). Similarly, histories that pertain to a rejected contract o¤er (e.g. (f; r; h)) can be identi…ed with those of ¡: On the other hand, on the path of a history like (f; a; h); the contract o¤er f is accepted, and the game reached to h 2 H with agent A playing in place of player 2.
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Of course, with or without delegation, the play in ¤ must lead to an outcome of the principalsonly game. Indeed, to any terminal history z ¤ 2 Z ¤ ; there corresponds a unique outcome z 2 Z in ¡ such that z ¤ 2 f(:D; z); (f; r; z); (f; a; z)g: We shall refer to this terminal history z as a pure outcome induced by z ¤ in ¡:
It is crucial to recognize that while player 1 observes whether or not a contract is accepted, that is, he always knows the identity of her opponent, he does not observe which contract is accepted (or rejected). Hence, once a contract is accepted, player 1 does not know the payo¤ function of his opponent (i.e., of player A). Players 2 and A; on the other hand, possess perfect information throughout the game so that all of their information sets are singletons.
25
Next we need to specify the payo¤ functions of the players. Since player 1 is not involved with any sort of a delegation activity, we have ¼ ¤ 1 (:D; z)´¼ ¤ 1 (f; µ; z)´¼ 1 (z) for all z 2 Z; µ 2 fa; rg; and f 2 f0; ±g Z : Similarly, the payo¤s of player 2 would not be altered if he chooses not to delegate, that is, ¼ ¤ 2 (:D; z)´¼ 2 (z) for all z 2 Z: On the other hand, player 2 incurs the cost c if he chooses to o¤er a contract, and pays the promised compensation to the agent in case a contract is signed. Therefore,
for all z and f . Finally, the delegate's payo¤s are determined as ¼ ¤ A (:D; z)´¼ ¤ A (f; r; z)´± and ¼ ¤ A (f; a; z)´f (z) for all z and f: This completes the description of the delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c):
In what follows, we shall investigate the sequential equilibria of ¤: However, to avoid certain technical di¢culties, we shall restrict ourselves to a particular subclass of SE(¤) in which the equilibrium strategy of the agent A is to accept a contract whenever the expected value of the contract equals his outside option ±: So, henceforth, all references to a sequential equilibrium of 2 3 An alternative model would have player 2 choosing …rst between not delegating and delegating, and then choosing a contract if he decides to delegate. All our results go through under this alternative modeling assumption.
2 4 For concreteness, we note that
The player function P ¤ is de…ned on the nonterminal histories in H ¤ by letting P ¤ (?)´2; P ¤ (f )´A; P ¤ (:D; h)´P ¤ (f; r; h)´P (h); and …nally, P ¤ (f; a; h)´A if P (h) = 2; and P ¤ (f; a; h)´1 if P (h) = 1: 2 5 Thus, the information partition of player 1 is ¤ should be taken to apply only to this subclass. While this sort of a tie-breaking assumption is commonly invoked in the related literature, it nevertheless amounts to a somewhat arbitrary equilibrium re…nement, and hence may justly be found objectionable. Fortunately, all of our results remain valid verbatim when this restriction is dispensed with, provided that one allows for an in…nite contract space (like R Z ), and de…ne strategies and beliefs in terms of simple probability measures. However, the analysis of the resulting model is substantially more complicated than the present one while it does not provide new insights. For this reason, we adopt here the standard tie-breaking postulate stated above without apology, and refer the reader to Koçkesen and Ok (1999) for the more general analysis.
The Main Results
Fix a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c]: As noted earlier, our main objective here is to understand the nature of the equilibria of the induced delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c) as it pertains to the implications of the possibility of delegation. Thus, the …rst question we need to address is if delegation takes place in equilibrium at all, while the second question is if the pre-delegation equilibrium outcome of the game ¡ is altered, provided that at least some degree of delegation takes place in equilibrium. The literature on delegation since the in ‡uential contribution of Katz (1991) exhibits clearly the contention that neither of these questions have an a¢rmative answer. Indeed, the analysis of Katz (1991) culminates in showing that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the principals-only game, and only these outcomes, can be reached via unobserved delegation in the Nash equilibria of the delegation game which satis…es a weak sequential rationality constraint. Consequently, a sequentially rational equilibrium outcome of the delegation game has to be a Nash equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game. More precisely, in the present setting, we have Proposition 1. If the pure outcome z ¤ is reached with positive probability in a sequential equilibrium of the delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c); then the pure outcome induced by z ¤ in the principals-only game ¡ can be reached with positive probability in a Nash equilibrium of ¡ in which player 1 plays sequentially rationally at every history:
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. Since the contract o¤ered by player 2 is not observable, the outside party, i.e., player 1, cannot condition his strategy on the contract. Therefore, rationality of player 1 implies that he must be o¤ering a contract that induces the agent to best respond to player 1 in terms of player 2's preferences. Similarly, rationality and consistency imply that player 1 must best respond to the agent's strategy that is induced by such an optimal contract. This entails that any sequential equilibrium outcome of the delegation game must be a Nash equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game. The last part of the claim which states that player 1's strategy must be sequentially rational at every history is just an easy implication of sequential rationality.
Moreover, it can be shown that the set of expected payo¤s of the principal 2 (gross of the cost of hiring) obtained in a sequential equilibrium of ¤(¡; ±; c) lies in the convex hull of NE ¤ 1 (¡) payo¤s of principal 2 which are at least as large as his subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤ in game ¡. Thus, the possibility of delegation does not alter in a payo¤-relevant way the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the principals-only game. In particular, we have the following negative result.
Corollary 1. If ¡ is a simultaneous move game with a unique Nash equilibrium, then the outcome of this equilibrium is identical to that of any sequential equilibrium of the delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c): 26
It is undeniable that Corollary 1 (the main thrust of which should be credited to Katz (1991) ) creates severe di¢culties for the well-known (perfect information) delegation results that concern simultaneous move principals-only games such as those of Vickers (1985) , Fersthman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) . However, as noted by Fersthman and Kalai (1997), its implications become limited when we shift our focus to games with sequential moves.
We show below that there is a formal sense in which Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are incomplete descriptions of matters in the case of extensive form principals-only games. While, if the cost of delegation ± + c is too high, delegation does not obtain for such games either, for low enough ± + c; the situation is vastly di¤erent. In particular, it turns out that, for small ± + c; any Nash equilibrium payo¤ of the delegating principal, which is at least as large as his subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤, and which can be obtained via a sequentially rational strategy of the outside party can also be obtained as a sequential equilibrium payo¤ of the delegation game. This is, in fact, a complete characterization of the set of all sequential equilibrium payo¤s of ¤(¡; ±; c); and is our …rst main result. Theorem 1. There exists an`> 0 such that ± + c <`implies that
where ¦ SE 2 (¤(¡; ±; c)) is the set of all sequential equilibrium (expected) payo¤s for player 2.
This result says that delegation may alter the equilibrium outcome of an extensive form game that would obtain in the absence of delegation in a very large class of games when the cost of delegation is small. Notice that unobserved delegation expands the set of equilibrium outcomes to include those in which the delegate best responds to the outside party's strategy from the perspective of the principal's preferences, but not necessarily in a sequentially rational manner, whereas the outside party plays sequentially rationally. In that sense delegation achieves a commitment e¤ect even under unobservable contracts by freeing the principal from the straitjacket of sequential rationality, which in turn enables him to issue threats (that would otherwise be incredible) via his delegate. A more detailed intuition behind this theorem is provided at the end of this section.
The next question is if one can strengthen the argument for delegation by showing that reasonable requirements of rationality ensure that strategic delegation is bound to alter the equilibrium 2 6 Formally speaking, Corollary 1 is not implied by Proposition 1 since in the latter result we have assumed that ¡ is an extensive game with perfect information. However, as we shall stress in Section 6 again, Proposition 1 also applies to any extensive game with a unique sequential equilibrium (and hence to normal form games with a unique equilibrium). The proof of this version of Proposition 1 is analogous to the one we shall provide in Section 7.
outcome of an extensive form principals-only game in a way that bene…ts the delegating principal. Put more precisely, the query at hand is this: Given a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c]; is there any well-supported equilibrium of ¤(¡; ±; c) in which delegation does not take place?
Of course, the requirement of well-supportedness is indeed needed in the statement of this query, for we know that there exist sequential equilibria in which delegation does not obtain. (Recall Section 2.) As noted earlier, a major point of the present paper is that such equilibria are unreasonable, and a suitable forward induction and/or out-of-equilibrium behavior restriction argument will eliminate all equilibria that envisage a neutral role for delegation. We propose the notion of "well-supportedness" in order to formalize this point, and examine the implications of the possibility of delegation with respect to well-supported equilibria.
Our second main result provides a complete answer to the query stated above by characterizing the conditions under which delegation obtains in any well-supported equilibrium.
Theorem 2. There exists an`> 0 such that
for any well-supported equilibrium (¯; ¹) 2 SE w-s (¤(¡; ±; c)) and any ± + c <`.
But does the presence of delegation imply that the pre-delegation outcome of the principals-only game will be altered? The answer is yes. An easy corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 is that, when delegation occurs, this always (strictly) bene…ts the delegating party, and hence the pre-delegation outcome (i.e., the subgame perfect equilibrium of ¡) is bound to be altered through delegation in a payo¤-relevant way in any well-supported equilibrium.
Consequently, in a well-supported equilibrium, player 2 will choose not to delegate if he is already in an advantageous situation in the principals-only game ¡ (in the sense that the pre-delegation outcome is already the best that he can achieve in any Nash equilibrium) whereas he will delegate if there is a Nash equilibrium in which he obtains a payo¤ strictly greater than his subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤ and in which player 1 plays sequentially rationally. So, for instance, in any (discrete) Stackelberg duopoly situation, the leader …rm will not choose to delegate the decisionmaking power. On the other hand, by Theorem 2, the follower …rm will (generically) choose to delegate the decision-making to an agent even when the incentive contracts are fully unobservable. Moreover, the delegation decision will certainly bene…t the follower …rm. Therefore, in sequential market games, it turns out that there is good reason to take Fersthman-Judd like delegation results seriously even in the presence of unobservable contracts.
Finally, to bring to the fore the basic intuitions behind these results, we now sketch the main steps of their proofs. The formal demonstrations are relegated to Section 7.
1. (Lemmas 1-2 ) The …rst step is to notice that any contract o¤ered with positive probability in a sequential equilibrium of ¤(¡; ±; c) is accepted with probability one and conditional on accepting such a contract agent A best responds to player 1's strategy according to the preferences of the principal. This is because (i) rejection leads to an expected payo¤ of ¦ SPE 2 ¡ c; which is worse than the no-delegation payo¤ ¦ SPE 2 ; (ii) if the contract does not lead the agent to best respond under that contract, then the principal can design an alternative (acceptable) contract that would force the agent best respond to player 1, thereby increasing the principal's expected payo¤.
2. (Lemmas 3-5) The next step is to show that, given his beliefs about the contracts, the equilibrium behavior of player 1 in ¤ after delegation, induces a sequentially rational strategy in the principals-only game ¡:
3. (Lemma 6) The above observations and the fact that player 2 would never delegate to obtain a payo¤ strictly smaller than his SPE payo¤ implies that
g: Furthermore, for small enough cost of delegation, the converse containment holds as well, i.e.,
4. (Lemma 7) If the cost of delegation is small enough, then player 2 never mixes between not delegating and o¤ering a contract. This is because the set of gross payo¤s that can be obtained by delegation is f¦ 2 2 ¦
, all equilibria involving delegation yields player 2 a net equilibrium payo¤ which is strictly greater than ¦ SPE 2 : Therefore, player 2 cannot be indi¤erent between delegating and not delegating in any sequential equilibria.
Steps (3) and (4) 
g for small enough ± + c: This establishes Theorem 1.
(Lemma 8)
The next step is to prove that well-supportedness demands that player 2 chooses not to delegate only if there exists no equilibrium that involves delegation. To see this, let (¯¤; ¹ ¤ ) be a well-supported equilibrium in which player 2 chooses not to delegate with probability one (recall step (4)), and thus receives ¦ SPE 2 : Now suppose that there exists an equilibrium (¯; ¹) which involves delegation. From our earlier observations, (¯; ¹) must be yielding player 2 a net payo¤ strictly greater than ¦ SPE 2 for small ± + c: Also, by de…nition of well-supportedness, the strategy of player 1 must be the same in¯¤ and¯, following an information set, say I; that is reached by equilibrium¯: One can show that player 2 can deviate in strategy pro…le¯¤ by o¤ering a contract which, under¯¤ A ; makes the agent reach information set I with probability 1, and then play in a way such that the net payo¤ of player 2 is the same with his payo¤ under strategy pro…le¯: In other words, there is a deviation for player 2 in equilibrium (¯¤; ¹ ¤ ) which gives him a payo¤ strictly greater than ¦ SPE 
Caveats, Extensions and Concluding Remarks
Two-Sided Delegation. We assumed above that only one of the parties has the opportunity to delegate. A natural question, therefore, is if the …ndings reported here still have a "bite" if both of the principals have an opportunity to delegate. This problem is analyzed in Koçkesen (1999b) where it is assumed that prior to the game both principals can o¤er contracts to their delegates without being informed about whether the other party delegates or not. The party that plays the game (either the principal or the delegate) knows the identity (but not the contract) of her opponent in the game phase. The …rst result is that the set of sequential equilibrium outcomes of the two-sided delegation game is a subset of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the principals-only game, which is the counterpart of Proposition 1 in this paper.
However, making more precise predictions is possible only by considering a subset of sequential equilibria in which neither principal randomizes between delegating and o¤ering a contract (they can, however, randomize between contracts). It is then possible to show that, in all such equilibria where only principal i delegates, the set of equilibrium gross payo¤s is equal the set of Nash equilibrium payo¤s of the principals-only game where principal i receives more than her SPE payo¤, and the other party plays sequentially rationally. Furthermore, the set of equilibrium payo¤s in which both parties delegate is equal to the set of Nash equilibrium payo¤s in which both principals receive more than their individually rational payo¤s (i.e., their minmax payo¤s). This second result echoes our Theorem 1, and also indicates the potential use of delegation by the principals as a cooperative device to attain Pareto improvements over the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
As for the implications of well-supported equilibrium for delegation, Koçkesen (1999b) shows that only a weaker version of Theorem 2 applies to two-sided delegation games. Namely, if there exists no sequential equilibrium in which one or both principals randomize between delegating and not delegating, and if in the principals-only game any one of the principals can bene…t by not playing in a sequentially rational manner, then at least one of the principals will choose to delegate in any well-supported equilibrium.
Renegotiation. An important assumption in our model is that contracts cannot be renegotiated once the outside party starts taking actions. This could be due to the physical impossibility of renegotiation, as it is the case in closed-door negotiations, or due to the fact that renegotiation is limited through a third party enforcement, or because it is too costly.
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In the framework of our paper, however, if costless renegotiation can take place at any point in the game and if the principal and the agent are symmetrically informed throughout the game, then delegation, with observed or unobserved contracts, would have no commitment power. This is because, due to the Pareto improving renegotiation opportunities, the delegate must behave sequentially rationally from the perspective of the delegating principal in any sequential equilibrium of such a delegation game. This may be contrasted with the work of Dewatripont (1988) and Caillaud et al. (1995) who show that, if there is asymmetric information between the principal and the delegate at the time of contracting, publicly announced contracts may have a commitment value even if they are renegotiable prior to the game stage. 28 Within the con…nes of the present framework, therefore, the positive results of this paper on the possibility of strategic delegation have applicability to real-world scenarios only to the extent that renegotiation is costly and/or limited.
Larger Classes of Principals-Only Games. While we have studied in Section 5 only those perfect information principals-only games with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, it is easy to generalize the present …ndings to larger classes of games. For instance, let ¡ be any …nite extensive form game with a unique sequential equilibrium outcome (and with¯¦ NE 2 (¡)¯< 1). The proof of Theorem 2 modi…es in a trivial manner to show that, whenever ¦ SE 2 < max ¦
, player 2 chooses to delegate with probability one in all well-supported equilibria of ¤(¡; ±; c).
Another interesting extension of our model obtains by considering the simultaneous move principals-only games. As Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 (as extended in the previous paragraph) show, if ¡ is a normal form game with a unique Nash equilibrium, then delegation never obtains in any equilibrium of the delegation game. However, as noted by a referee of this journal, if ¡ has multiple Nash equilibria, although there may exist sequential equilibria with no delegation, forward induction type of re…nements may lead to a selection in which the delegating principal obtains a strategic advantage. For example, if the principals-only game is that of the Battle of the Sexes game of Section 3 (but without the outside option), and if the cost of delegation is small enough, then all well-supported equilibria of the induced delegation game (which may or may not involve delegation) lead to the principal's preferred Nash outcome (T; L). This further emphasizes the two di¤erent dimensions of our results: …rst, if the underlying game is an extensive form game with a unique equilibrium outcome, it is possible that delegation would obtain as a sequential equilibrium of the induced delegation game; and, second, even if the underlying game is a simultaneous move game with multiple equilibria, the fact that delegation is a costly and observable decision may lead to equilibrium selection among the multiple Nash equilibria, provided that one subscribes to forward induction type re…nements.
Principal-Agent Bargaining. Another aspect of the present model which could be fruitfully generalized is the bargaining process between the principal and the delegate. We assumed here that principal makes a "take it or leave it" o¤er to the delegate within a symmetric and complete information context. In reality, of course, these assumptions are rarely valid. An interesting conjecture is that the existence of asymmetric information between the principal and the delegate might restrict the contracts that would be o¤ered in equilibrium in such a manner that Theorem 2 holds true under even weaker re…nements of sequential equilibrium than what we have proposed. Furthermore, the bargaining environment between the principal and the agent may impose limitations on the renegotiation possibilities later on, which may restore some commitment power to delegation even under renegotiation. The analysis of these issues, while certainly a promising avenue of research, falls outside the scope of the present paper.
Experiments. The main …ndings reported in this paper are based on a particular equilibrium re…nement the empirical validity of which must be tested against the data. An obvious way to conduct this test is of course via experiments in which agents play a delegation game such as the simple bargaining game presented in Section 2. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) conducts an experimental test of strategic delegation under observable and unobservable contracts within the context of such an ultimatum bargaining game. They provide some results which are not really in line with any of the theoretical results in the literature including those in Fershtman and Kalai (1997) . We should note, however, that the structure of what Fershtman and Gneezy de…ne as a delegation game is not the same as what we used in this paper. In particular, in their setting contract space is de…ned di¤erently and the player who delegates does not have the option of playing the game himself. Consequently, testing the empirical validity of the theory we proposed here remains as an integral part of our future research agenda.
Proofs A. Consistency and Sequential Rationality
Given an extensive form game¨´[N; H; P; (I i ; ¼ i ) i2N ]; a strategy pro…le¯; and h; h 0 2 H; we let p[¯j h](h 0 ) be the probability of reaching history h 0 ; conditional on h being reached and from there on the game being played according to¯: Also de…ne O[¯j h] as the probability distribution over terminal nodes induced by¯; conditional on h being reached. Given any strategy pro…le¯; we de…ne the expected payo¤ of player i conditional on history h being reached as
To simplify the notation, we write ¦ i (¯) for ¦ i (¯j ;); the expected payo¤ of player i induced byī n the entire game. The expected payo¤ of player i conditional on his/her information set I being reached is de…ned as
In turn, an assessment (¯; ¹) is said to be sequentially rational if, for all i 2 N and all I 2 I i ,
It is called consistent if there is a sequence of completely mixed assessments ((¯n; ¹ n )); where each ¹ n is derived from¯n by the Bayes rule, that converges to (¯; ¹): A consistent and sequentially rational assessment is called a sequential equilibrium (which is subject to the tie-breaking assumption mentioned in the …nal paragraph of Section 4 in the case of a delegation game).
B. Preliminary Observations
Consider a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c] and let (¯¤; ¹ ¤ ) 2 SE(¤(¡; ±; c)): Clearly, for each f 2 f0; ±g Z ; the behavioral strategy¯¤ A induces a behavioral strategy in the game ¡; which is de…ned as b
Similarly,¯¤ 1 induces a behavioral strategy b ¤ 1 2 S 1 (¡); i.e.,
For any h 2 H; we denote by o[b ¤ 1 ; b ¤ f;2 j h] the probability distribution over terminal nodes that will be reached if each player plays the game ¡ according to the strategy pro…le
Consequently, we write the expected payo¤ of the agent who takes on a contract f by
(G is similarly de…ned for contract g.) The expected payo¤ of player 2 (gross of the payment to the agent and the contracting cost) is similarly written as
for any f with¯¤ A [f](a) = 1:
C. Proof of Proposition 1
In what follows, we …x a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c]; and denote the delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c) by ¤ for brevity. For any equilibrium strategy pro…le¯¤ in ¤; we let C(¯¤ 2 )´supp(¯¤ 2 [;])nf:Dg:
and rationality at ; would entail that Proof. Fix an arbitrary f 2 C(¯¤ 2 ) and take any strategy b ¤ 2 2 BR 2 (b ¤ 1 ): Consider now the function g 2 f0; ±g Z de…ned as
where s 2 2 supp(b ¤ f;2 ): 30 We proceed by means of claims.
Proof of Claim 2.1. By de…nition of g; given ¹ ¤ and¯¤ 1 ; the agent must choose b ¤ g;2 in order to guarantee that
This yields G(b ¤ 1 ; b ¤ g;2 ) = ± and¯¤ A [g](a) = 1 (since the agent is assumed to accept any contract that pays her ±).
Take any s 0
did not hold, this would mean that there exists a history h 2 H(2) that is reached with positive probability under both (b ¤ 1 ; s 2 ) and (b ¤ 1 ; s 0 2 ) and that satis…es s 2 (h) 6 = s 0 2 (h): But then it is obvious that this would imply 2 ) = ±: Proof of Claim 2.3. Since Claim 2.2 shows that the agent accepts the contract f with probability one, her expected payo¤ conditional on accepting this contract must be equal to her outside option, that is,
The claim then follows from the fact that the highest possible expected payo¤ of the agent is ±: k Our objective now is to establish that
To derive a contradiction, we assume that
: But then using Claims 2.1-3, we …nd Proof. If C(¯¤ 2 ) = ; then the claim is trivially established, so throughout we assume that C(¯¤ 2 ) 6 = ;: Let H o (1) stand for the set of all shortest histories in H(1): 31 We let I h´f (f; a; h) : f 2 f0; ±g Z g for any h 2 H(1), and de…ne
It is important to note that the de…nition of T h is independent of¯¤ 1 since p[¯¤j;](f; a; h) is independent of¯¤ 1 for any shortest history h in H(1): Therefore, by weak consistency and sequential rationality, we havē
is the behavioral strategy in ¡ induced by¯¤ 1 ; we thus have, for all h 2 H o (1) with T h > 0,
where the sums run through all f 2 C(¯¤ 2 ) and z 2 Z: (Recall that, for all such h; consistency assures that
by Lemma 2.) But notice that (5) holds trivially for any h 2 H o (1) such that p[¯¤j;](f; a; h) = 0 for all f 2 f0; ±g Z ; since in this case the maximand of the associated optimization problem is identically zero. Consequently, (5) holds for all h 2 H o (1); and we thus have
Proof of Claim 3.1. Take any z 2 Z \ S h2H o (1) H(h): By de…nition of H o (1); there can be at most one h in H o (1) that is consistent with z: By the choice of z; therefore, there exists a unique h z 2 H o (1) that is consistent with z:
That is, Ho (1)´fh 2 H(1) : there does not exist any h 0 2 H(1) and h 00 6 = ; such that h = (h 0 ; h 00 )g:
Using Claim 3.1 and (6), we …nd
since it is readily observed that, for any f; the probability o[
Moreover, for any
o that, by (7), we have
Furthermore, sequential rationality of player 1 at any I h ; h 2 H(1); implies that b ¤ 1 is a best response to some b 2 2 S 2 (¡) with
To state the next lemma, let h 2 HnZ be any non-terminal history, and de…ne H(h) as the set of all histories consistent with h: 32 Lemma 4. Let b 1 2 S 1 (¡) and let B h 2 (b 1 ) be the set of all b 2 2 S 2 (¡) such that
Proof. Fix a b 1 2 S 1 (¡) and a h ¤ 2 H(1): Since H(h ¤ ) \ H(1) is obviously a non-empty …nite set, we may write, for some positive integer n; H(h ¤ ) \ H(1) = fh 1 ; h 2 ; : : : ; h n g where jh 1 j 6 ¢ ¢ ¢ 6 jh n j : We will prove by induction that T fB h j 2 (b 1 ) : n > j > kg 6 = ; for all k = 1; 2; : : : ; n: The statement is trivially true for k = n: Now, suppose that it is true for k = l 6 n:
Also let H k = fh k ; h k+1 ; : : : ; h n g ; for all k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng : If (b 1 ; b ¤ 2 ) reaches every history in H l with positive probability, then b 1 must be a best response to b ¤ 2 at every history in H l as well, so b ¤ 2 2
T fB h j 2 (b 1 ) : n > j > l ¡ 1g; and we are done. Suppose, therefore, that there exists a history in H l which is precluded by (b 1 ; b ¤ 2 ): Let h t be the shortest such history: De…ne
3 2 Formally speaking, h 00 2 H(h) i¤ h 00 = (h; h 0 ) for some h 0 : T fB
then there exists a behavioral strategy pro…le
there is nothing to prove. So, suppose that b ¤ 1 is not a best response to b ¤ 2 at some history. Since (b ¤ 1 ; b ¤ 2 ) 2 NE(¡); any such history must be o¤-the-path of (b ¤ 1 ; b ¤ 2 ). Let H = fh 1 ; h 2 ; : : : ; h n g denote the set of all such histories. Clearly, for each h j 2Ĥ; there exists an earlier history h 2 H such that, when
is played, h j can never be reached, no matter how the behavioral strategies at other histories are speci…ed. Let ¹ h j denote the shortest one among all those histories. Notice that since there is a unique sequence of actions that reach h j ; the history ¹ h j is uniquely de…ned.
PartitionĤ into m 6 n disjoint sets,Ĥ ® ; ® = 1; : : : m; such that two histories h j and h k belong to the same setĤ ® if and only if
be the set of the shortest histories in eacĥ H ® : We will now construct a strategy pro…le
To do this, …x an ®; and pick any h 2Ĥ ® : Assume …rst that P ( ¹ h) = 1: Then, change b ¤ 1 at each history in H ® \ H(1) so as to make the new strategy a best response to b ¤ 2 at those histories. (We can do this by applying a simple backward induction in every subgame starting with a history inĤ min ® ). Assume next that P ( ¹ h) = 2: In this case, since b ¤ 1 is a best response to some b 2 at any history, we can use Lemma 4 to change b ¤ 2 to make b ¤ 1 a best response to it at all histories inĤ ® \ H(1): Leave (b ¤ 1 ; b ¤ 2 ) unchanged in all histories which do not belong toĤ and call the newly constructed strategy pro…le (b 0 1 ; b 0 2 ): By construction, b 0 1 is a best response to b 0 2 at every history. Furthermore, since
at only those histories which are not reached by
Therefore, if we can show that (b 0 1 ; b 0 2 ) 2 NE(¡); we will be done. To do this, notice that, since b 0 2 is di¤erent from b ¤ 2 at only those histories excluded by b ¤ 2 we have : We need to show that there exists a (¯; ¹) 2 SE(¤) such that¦ 2 (¯) = ¦ 2 : We …rst introduce some notation and then construct such an equilibrium by distinguishing between two cases. for all J 2 I 1 (I);
where I 1 (I) is the set of all information sets of player 1 that follows I: Let us now pick any f 2 C(¯2) such that b f;2 reaches I with positive probability. We have ; and the claim follows from Lemma 1(a). k By the choice of f; b f;2 reaches I with positive probability. (Recall that player 1 does not play a role in I being reached since I = I h with h being a shortest history in H(1)). We choose any pure strategy s 2 2 supp(b f;2 ) such that s 2 reaches I. 
On the other hand, by Lemma 2 and the fact that s 2 2 BR 2 (b 1 );
By using (11), (12) 
